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1. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to explore what the dis-
tinct literatures on accounting standards and the
economics of standards can learn from each other.
Although some important pioneering contributions
have explored the relationship between the two
(for example, Bromwich, 1985; Solomons, 1986;
Taylor and Turley, 1986), there is more to be done.
We show that much of the recent literature on the
economics of standards can help to inform our 
understanding of the role played by accounting
standards. Moreover, we shall see that those con-
tributions to the economics literature that try to de-
fine the right number of standards in a particular
setting can also shed some light on current debates
about the pros and cons of adopting a single set of
accounting standards. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In
Section 2, we review the role of standards in pro-
moting economic efficiency and wealth creation.
In Section 3, we review the role of standards in
promoting more efficient capital markets. In
Section 4, we start to address the question, ‘how
many standards should we have’, by drawing out
some lessons from the economics literature on
standards. In Section 5, we draw out some conclu-
sions from the accounting literature on the case for
and against a single set of global standards.
Section 6 provides some concluding comments be-
fore Section 7 provides a postscript on the similar-
ity between accounting standards and World Wide
Web (WWW) standards.
2. The role of standards in promoting 
economic efficiency
Most economists would agree that the following
economic mechanisms, amongst others, lie at the
heart of wealth creation in a competitive economy:
• the division of labour
• international trade
• innovation
• competition in open markets
• cooperation to exploit network effects
• trust between trading partners.
This list does not include any reference to stan-
dards or standardisation as such. But as we shall
see below, all of these mechanisms may work
much better in the presence of open standards and
standardisation.
The pioneering study of the economics of stan-
dards is generally taken to be that by Hemenway
(1975). There are incidental (and indeed, very im-
portant) references to the role of standards before
that, and indeed the role of standards in the growth
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of international trade was not lost on economic
historians (e.g. Erwin, 1960; Skinner, 1954). But
Hemenway’s (1975) was the first book devoted ex-
plicitly to the economics of standards. The litera-
ture took off rapidly in 1985, with the publication
of three papers on the emergence of de facto stan-
dards by David (1985), Farrell and Saloner (1985)
and Katz and Shapiro (1985). A very recent survey
is offered by Hesser et al. (2006).
That literature distinguishes four types of stan-
dard – or perhaps it would be better to say four
purposes of standardisation (David, 1987; Swann,
2000):
• standards for compatibility and interoperability
• minimum quality (or safety) standards
• standards to promote scale economies by effi-
cient variety reduction
• standards of measurement and product/service
description.
Although the economic issues involved vary
across these four different purposes, they are all
inter-related. Accordingly, rather than organise our
discussion around these four types or purposes, we
organise our discussion around the effects of stan-
dards. Much of the literature is positive about the
economic role of standards, but in some circum-
stances there is also a downside. Accordingly, 
we review both the constructive contribution 
of standards (Section 2.1) and the downside
(Section 2.2).
2.1. The constructive contribution of standards
In what follows, we identify six mechanisms by
which standards contribute to economic growth
and efficiency.
Division of labour
Adam Smith (1776) noted that even in the simplest
forms of manufacture, it was customary to find
that the production process was divided into sever-
al distinct parts. Each labourer would work on just
one of those tasks. Smith argued that this division
of labour had a central role in economic develop-
ment and wealth creation. For a worker, specialis-
ing in one task could achieve levels of productivity
far in excess of what could be achieved if the
worker carried out all the steps in the production
process.1
However, the division of labour only works as a
manufacturing strategy if the fruits of this divided
labour can be recombined harmoniously to
achieve a quality finished product or service. This
recombination depends essentially on an under-
standing between adjacent labourers in the produc-
tion process. The first worker must complete
his/her task in a form and to a standard expected
by the second so that the second can quickly pro-
ceed with his/her own task. The recombination of
these fruits of divided labour therefore depend on
norms or standards – whether formal or informal.
Informal norms may be limited to the one firm,
and indeed, they may be limited to an adjacent pair
of workers. By contrast, formal standards may be
global and open. But either way, the success of the
division of labour depends on standards. 
Smith illustrated his discussion of the division of
labour with reference to the manufacture of pins.
But an even more striking example, from the same
period, was the manufacture of watches and
clocks, where there existed an extraordinarily in-
tricate division of labour. Such a division of labour
would never work unless each component is made
to a commonly understood specification. Without
that, the clock-maker could never expect to assem-
ble all the parts into a working timepiece. But sup-
ported by appropriate standards, the division of
labour enhanced productivity and quality, and
brought affordable timepieces within the reach of
more and more ordinary citizens.
Standards, transaction costs and international
trade
We know from the earliest history of trading that
standards were essential for the growth of trade.
We are reminded of this when we visit the great
museums of the world as tourists. There we find
standard weights and standard lengths in elegant
forms, dating from ancient civilisations.
Trade is a powerful force for economic efficien-
cy. One of the main arguments for buying compo-
nents from a specialist supplier rather than making
them in-house is that the specialist may be able to
produce the same component better or cheaper.
The specialist supplier enjoys economies of scale
or other competitive advantages from specialisa-
tion that cannot be realised if the customer makes
the component in-house. One of the main argu-
ments against buying, on the other hand, is that
dealing with an outside supplier may embroil the
firm in a variety of transaction costs – as they are
called in economics. 
Transaction costs describe the costs that two par-
ties face in doing business with each other.
Transaction costs can take several forms, including
the costs of ensuring that a particular supplier will
produce exactly what the customer wants. Such
costs can be substantial when the component is
very complex and compatibility with the cus-
tomer’s requirements is critical. As a result of
transaction costs, it may no longer seem attractive
to source components from a specialist supplier,
even if that supplier has potential cost advantages
in production.
The use of standards can help to reduce these
transaction costs (Akkermans and van der Horst,
192 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
1 Charles Babbage (1835), who first invented the idea of a
programmable computer, further developed our understanding
of the division of labour.
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2002; Antonelli, 1994; Blois, 1990; den Butter 
et al., 2007; Hudson and Jones, 1997, 2001; North,
1990; Williamson, 1998). If we seek a standard
component from an external supplier, then even if
the component is a complex one, the costs of en-
suring that the supplier produces exactly what we
want are reduced. By reducing transaction costs,
standards can make it cost-effective for companies
to use the market to source specialised compo-
nents. This increases the use of the market, and
may indeed increase the geographical extent of the
market. A number of studies have explored the
positive link between standards and the extent of
trade: Beghin and Bureau (2001), Blind (2004),
Hudson and Jones (2003), Maskus et al. (2005),
Swann et al. (1996), Wilson and Otsuki (2003).
One of the most striking examples of this
process at work must be the personal computer. If
we open up a personal computer and look at the
national origins of the different components, it is
common to find that they come from at least 10–15
different countries, and sometimes many more.
Globalisation has progressed especially fast in
electronics because there are so very many well-
defined standards. This has made it easier to out-
source production of standard components to low
cost companies that specialise in particular parts of
the vertical chain. The buyer seeks a standard com-
ponent: he doesn’t really care and, indeed, may not
know where it comes from, or who produces it.2
However, we need to finish this sub-section with
a cautionary note. A number of studies have sug-
gested that while open international standards may
have the benign effects described above, idiosyn-
cratic national standards may have less desirable
effects (Lecraw, 1984, 1987). We comment further
on that below.
Standards and innovation
The idea that innovation lies at the heart of wealth
creation is perhaps uncontroversial. But the asser-
tion that standardisation has a central role in inno-
vation may seem, to some at least, rather more
surprising. When, in 2005, the Department of
Trade and Industry published a study on the eco-
nomic benefits of standardisation (Temple et al.,
2005), The Scotsman reacted with the delightfully
ironic headline, ‘Red tape can be good for busi-
ness.’3
This quotation captures the essential paradox in
the relationship between standardisation and inno-
vation. The DTI study to which we refer found that
about half the respondents to a survey said that
standards help their innovation activities and about
half said that regulations and standards were a con-
straint on innovation. We might guess that this is a
simple split in opinion, with half finding standards
helpful while the other half find standards a con-
straint. But in fact that was not what the survey
showed. The majority of those who said that stan-
dards were a help also said that standards were a
constraint. And the majority of those who said that
standards were not a help also said that standards
were not a constraint. In short, standards seem to
help and constrain at the same time.
This is consistent with a metaphor of standards
developed in Swann (2000). Standardisation does
for innovation something similar to what pruning
does for fruit trees. A programme of pruning may
constrain the shape of the tree and reduce growth
in some directions in the short run. But in the
longer run, pruning promotes a healthy shape in
the tree and helps to maximise the amount of use-
able fruit that can be harvested. In the same way,
standardisation constrains innovation options in
the short term, but by promoting healthy market
development can maximise useful product variety
in the long term.
So how do standards support innovation? We
can find several mechanisms at work here (Berg,
1989; DIN, 2000; Foray, 1998; Gabel, 1987, 1991;
Grindley, 1995; Langlois, 1992).
First, as we argued above, standards support the
division of labour, and as Smith argued, the divi-
sion of labour can help generate certain types of
innovation activity. Second, open standards can
help to open up markets and allow new entrants –
more on this below. As Schumpeter argued, the
new entrant is a powerful force for innovation.
Third, the existence of generally accepted meas-
urement standards allows the innovative company
to prove that its innovative products do indeed
have superior performance. In the absence of such
measurement standards, the innovator may not be
able to sustain a premium for his product in the
market because he cannot prove its superiority. If
the innovator cannot achieve a premium for his in-
novations, then the economic incentive for innova-
tion may be lost.
And fourth – a point we discuss below – stan-
dards help us derive the greatest value from our
networks. Open standards allow innovative en-
trants to take advantage of network effects, and
market add-ons which are compatible with the
core technology and enhance its functionality. In
the absence of open standards, such innovative
entry is hard or impossible, but in the presence of
open standards such entry is relatively easy and
often profitable. One of the leading examples of
this is sometimes called the ‘Lotus 1-2-3 phenom-
enon’. Before the Windows era in personal com-
puting, Lotus 1-2-3 was the leader in the
spreadsheet market. Rather than make their prod-
uct a closed and entirely proprietary design, Lotus
Vol. 39 No. 3 2009 International Accounting Policy Forum. 193
2 Few buyers would insist on opening up a computer before
purchase to find out where the components come from. But
even if it is of little importance to the user, it is very instruc-
tive to the economist!
3 The Scotsman, 20 June (2005).
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had decided in 1985 to make sections of their
source code accessible to third party software
houses. This encouraged a large number of other
software houses to produce add-ons which would
work in conjunction with Lotus 1-2-3. This was
good for Lotus and for the other software houses.
It enhanced the power of the 1-2-3 platform.
Equally, without this opportunity to produce
Lotus-compatible add-ons, the third party software
houses could not have achieved such success for
their specialised add-on products (Swann, 1990).
Competition in open markets: reducing barriers
to entry
Most economists argue that competition in open
markets is generally a good thing for the efficient
operation of an economy. In the view of Smith
(1776) and many 19th century political econo-
mists, competition was a good thing because it
promoted the efficient, drove out the inefficient,
and secured a low price for the consumer. The 20th
century economist, Joseph Schumpeter (1954),
went further and argued that low prices were only
the beginning of the benefits of competition. The
real benefits were to be found in the innovations to
which competition gives rise: the new source of
supply, the new business model, the new product,
the new service, and so on.
For markets to be genuinely open, a lot of condi-
tions must be satisfied. There must be no barriers
to entry which give an incumbent in the market an
advantage over entrants just because it is an in-
cumbent. Now, for sure, open standards cannot 
remove all barriers to entry. And in some circum-
stances, idiosyncratic standards may constitute a
barrier to entry more than an aid to entry – see
Section 2.2. But open standards representing a bal-
ance of producer, consumer and third-party inter-
ests can help to enable open markets and hence
increase competition (Lehr, 1996; Reddy, 1987;
OTA, 1992; Swann, 2000; Veall, 1995)
Why is this? If the technological characteristics
required of a product or service are not defined in
a standard, then incumbents with a long history of
trading in an industry have an advantage over po-
tential entrants, because the former have accumu-
lated tacit knowledge that enables them to produce
what is required in this market. The entrant, by
contrast, has to embark on reverse engineering or
trial and error. By contrast, if the technological
characteristics required of a product or service are
defined in a standard, then incumbents have less of
an advantage over the entrant. The open standard
opens up the market club to new entrants because
the rules of membership are now set out on paper.
Sometimes large businesses are resistant to open
standards because they believe that these increase
competition. They are right!
The history of the personal computer provides a
powerful illustration of how the existence and use
of open standards allowed many new entrants into
the computer industry. The fact that IBM devised
an open standard and outsourced the production of
its components to many small electronics and soft-
ware companies may not have helped its own
long-term success in this market. But it provides a
powerful example of how open standards facilitate
entry, strong competition and the complete restruc-
turing of an industry (Langlois, 1992).
Nevertheless, some elements of popular opinion
still have difficulty with these assertions. The pop-
ular press enjoys stories of idiosyncratic national
standards that act as a barrier to imports into that
country’s market. We shall return to this theme in
Section 2.2.
Co-operation to exploit network effects
In economics, a network technology is any tech-
nology where the value to the user depends not just
on the intrinsic merits of the technology itself, but
also on the size and composition of the network of
other users of the same technology. Economists
talk of network effects as the additional benefits
derived (directly or indirectly) from the fact that
there is a large community of other users. Network
technologies and network effects are pervasive in
the modern economy (Rohlfs, 1974; Katz and
Shapiro, 1985; Farrell and Saloner, 1985).
Economics has several ‘laws’ of network effects
which describe how the value of the network in-
creases with size (summarised in Swann, 2002).
These are, to be honest, not like the laws of a pre-
cise science – such as the laws of thermodynamics
– so it might be better to think of them as ‘rules of
thumb’. The best known is called Metcalfe’s Law.
This asserts that the total value that an economy
derives from a network depends on the variety of
two-way communication linkages that can be sus-
tained in the network, and that is approximately
proportional to the square of the network size.
However, this law can only apply if there is sub-
stantial compatibility between the different net-
work members. And that, in turn, calls for
ubiquitous, open standards.
Some of the best known examples of Metcalfe’s
Law are in communications. The value of a tele-
phone comes mainly from the network of others
who also own telephones, and with whom tele-
phone conversations can be held. Equally, the
value of e-mail comes mainly from the network of
others who also use e-mail.
Berners-Lee (1999), the originator of the WWW,
has written of the necessity of open and non-pro-
prietary standards for the efficient operation of the
internet. He, and other writers, have written of the
damage done to the internet when some users as-
sert their intellectual property rights over parts of
the network. When that is done, it undermines
Metcalfe’s Law and reduces the value we can de-
rive from the network. Farrell (1995) argues that
194 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
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there are good reasons to argue for a light touch to-
wards intellectual property protection in network
industries.
Standards and trust between sellers and buyers
The final item on our list of essential mechanisms
in economic development is trust between traders.
Amongst those who study business ethics and cor-
porate social responsibility there is a saying that,
‘ethical business is good business’. This is reassur-
ing but also surprising. For if ethical business
strategies were always the best business strategies,
then there would surely be no problem of business
ethics. But the case of Enron (amongst other cor-
porate scandals) amply demonstrates that there is
such a problem! The resolution to this puzzle is the
assertion that even if ethical business is in the joint
long-term interests of all parties to the business
deal, it is not necessarily in the short-term interests
of all.
One very topical area where standards are essen-
tial to trust between buyers and sellers are stan-
dards of measurement. It is good for a market if all
the traders in it can be relied on to measure and de-
scribe their goods honestly. Indeed, a reputation
for honest trading is essential to the long-term
prosperity of the market. If traders in a market
earned a reputation for sharp practice in measuring
and describing their products, then buyers would
be wary of using that market and would go else-
where.4
These problems relate to what modern econom-
ics calls ‘information asymmetry’. In a very fa-
mous paper, Akerlof (1970) demonstrated that if
the seller knows more about the quality of the
goods or service being traded than does the buyer,
then the seller may be in a position to exploit the
ignorance of the buyer. The buyer, knowing this, is
wary of buying from this supplier because he does
not trust him to behave entirely honestly. In the ex-
treme case, buyers may withdraw altogether from
the market because of this lack of trust. That, in
turn, may lead honest sellers to withdraw, if they
cannot clearly distinguish themselves from the dis-
honest traders. We find that the exploitation of
asymmetric information and a lack of trust means
that ‘bad drives out good’.5 The result is a marked
decline in trading.
How do standards help to resolve this?
Standards can help to reduce information asymme-
try or reduce the problems caused by asymmetric
information. If an honest trader can certify that a
product conforms to a standard, then the customer
can buy without facing the risk described before.
Or if standards are observable and enforceable, the
buyer can hold the dishonest trader to account if
the product fails to meet the accepted standard. If
the standards and their accreditation are open and
impartial, then it is harder for one trader to exploit
the ignorance of another. It is possible for customers
to identify suppliers who they can trust (Boom,
1995; David, 1987; Leland, 1979). Moreover meas-
urement standards will also serve to correct the in-
formation asymmetry because they furnish the
customer with the means to measure whether the
product is of the required quality (Bacharach 1991;
Tassey 1982).
This function of standards will become ever
more important. As some of the products we buy
become ever more complex, and as the processes
by which they are made become ever more com-
plex and opaque, many buyers find themselves out
of their depth. The existence and use of open and
impartial standards is one of the mechanisms that
allow them to buy with confidence.
2.2. The downside of standards
The reader may think that Section 2.1 sounds 
almost too good to be true. Is there no downside to
standards? Yes, there can be a downside in certain
circumstances. Here we touch briefly on four 
issues.
Strategic idiosyncracy: increased barriers to entry
In Section 2.1, we argued that standards could re-
duce barriers to entry. The arguments in that part
of the paper apply to open international standards,
which offer a balance between the interests of dif-
ferent producers and consumers. But if a national
standard is drafted with the exclusive interest of
domestic producers in mind, and with no regard to
the interests of domestic customers, then it can in-
crease barriers to entry and competition (Lecraw,
1984, 1987; Mcintyre, 1997). 
The literature is clear that if one player has
undue control over the way in which a standard is
defined, then they will be able to slant that stan-
dard to give themselves a decisive competitive ad-
vantage (Swann, 2000). For that reason, there are
substantial incentives for companies and national
agencies to participate in standards-setting so that
the outcome is to their competitive advantage
(ANSI, 2000; DIN, 2000; Grindley, 1995).
Risk of monopolisation
Moreover, especially in the computer industry,
there has been much discussion of how closed
Vol. 39 No. 3 2009 International Accounting Policy Forum. 195
4 The idea is actually an old one. Visitors to the Market Hall
in the city of Truro, UK, will find a plaque on the wall (bear-
ing the date, 1615) which cautions all market traders as fol-
lows: ‘Who seek to find eternal treasure must use no guile in
weight or measure.’ The author of this rhyme clearly implied
that it was not just the trader’s worldly wealth that was at stake
but also his progress in the hereafter. But the reason for locat-
ing the plaque in a market hall must have been the recognition
that a reputation for honest trading was essential to the long-
term prosperity of the market.
5 The idea that bad drives out good is an old idea, usually
called Gresham’s Law. But strictly speaking, the original
Gresham’s Law is not about asymmetric information as such.
We are grateful to Brian Singleton-Green for this point. 
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standards act as barriers to entry. It is usually pos-
sible for competitors to produce applications soft-
ware to run on a proprietary operating system. But
there remains the question of whether a third party
application can ever perform as well on a propri-
etary operating system as the rival application pro-
duced by the owner of the proprietary standard.
This has been a particular concern in the context of
Microsoft.
Because standards-setting will often tend to gen-
erate a single monopoly standard, there is the ad-
ditional risk of lock-in to an inferior standard.
Following the pioneering work of David (1985), a
considerable number of studies have identified
lock-in as a real hazard (see Swann, 2000 for a
summary of that literature). On the other hand,
some authors (notably, Liebowitz and Margolis,
1990, 1994) have argued that this lock-in to an in-
ferior standard is at worst an ‘uncommon tragedy’.
Raising compliance costs
Standards can impose compliance costs on firms
that have to meet these standards. This is especial-
ly relevant in the context of environmental stan-
dards (Besanko, 1987; Livernois and McKenna,
1999) but can apply to all types of standards. In ad-
dition there is a risk of a particular form of regula-
tory capture whereby firms seek to influence
standards-setters to impose a demanding standard,
because although that imposes costs on the firm it
will impose even greater costs on their rivals.
Salop and Scheffman (1983) have argued that
standards are one of the mechanisms which firms
can target in order to raise rivals’ costs in this way.
It is worth noting that existing companies always
have an advantage over future companies in this
regard, because existing companies are often con-
sulted about new standards or new legislation, but
future competitors have no voice in the matter. 
Constraints on product design and reduced variety
In Section 2.1, we argued that in many respects,
standards would enhance innovation. That is true.
But there is an important respect in which a partic-
ular type of standard will constrain innovation and
reduce variety.6 This is the variety reduction stan-
dard – the adoption of a limited variety of standard
sizes to achieve economies of scale. The optimum
product variety for the firm may not be the same as
the optimum product variety for the customer
(Lancaster, 1979).
While this is certainly a possible problem with
standards, it may not be especially important in
practice. In Section 4 we summarise a very interest-
ing study by Bongers (1982) which tries to work
out the optimum number (and optimum sizes) of
concrete posts to supply a particular market. He
found that, depending on some assumptions, the
optimum number of posts was between  5 and 10,
and in his analysis, relatively few customers lose
out heavily because of a lack of variety.
3. The specific role of accounting standards
in promoting economic efficiency
3.1. The constructive contribution of standards
Division of ‘labour’
Since Adam Smith wrote about the division of
labour we have seen a huge shift from businesses
run by the owners to ones where functions are di-
vided between absentee shareholders, on the one
side, and salaried managers on the other. Berle and
Means (1932) famously documented the division;
and AT&T provides a leading case of the dispersal
of share ownership: by the late 20th century its list
of shareholders reached three million. As Adam
Smith would have predicted, this public company
structure brings great benefits in terms of risk-
spreading and of financing large scale projects
which would have been beyond the reach of indi-
vidual owner-managers. But it also brings chal-
lenges for two key functions of financial reports:
valuing equity and monitoring managers’ steward-
ship of shareholders’ assets. With valuation there
is an information asymmetry problem: absentee
shareholders are typically far less well-informed
than insider managers about the prospects for their
investment. And with stewardship there is in addi-
tion an incentive problem – in Adam Smith’s
words again:
‘The directors of such [joint-stock] companies,
however, being the managers rather of other peo-
ple’s money than of their own, it cannot well be
expected that they should watch over it with the
same anxious vigilance with which the partners
in a private copartnery frequently watch over
their own … Negligence and profusion, there-
fore, must always prevail, more or less, in the
management of the affairs of such a company.’
Accounting standards have now been in place
for equities for so long that no-one can remember
– and it is hard to imagine – valuation and steward-
ship without them. But a glimpse of that laissez
faire counterfactual is provided by another finan-
cial sector which ‘evolved’ separately and did not
install standards until relatively recently – a finan-
cial analogue, perhaps, of the Galapagos Islands.
This is Lloyd’s of London – a major market7 which
shares with the equity market serious information
asymmetry between principal and agent – the root
of Akerlof’s analysis and of Gresham’s Law dis-
cussed above – problems compounded in this case
by the unlimited liability of the principal: the ‘neg-
196 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
6 David (1995) tries to reconcile this tension between the in-
novation-enhancing and innovation-constraining effect of
standards.
7 Accounting at that time for no less than 14% of all UK fi-
nancial institutions’ invisible export earnings (Neill, 1987).
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ligence and profusion’ of the managers could cost
the Lloyd’s Names not just their initial investment
but everything they owned. 
As late as the early 1980s, the Lloyd’s market
could still be characterised as laissez faire in terms
of financial reporting. There was no regulatory re-
quirement for publication of Lloyd’s syndicate ac-
counts; and there were ‘no standard accounting or
audit practices or rules in relation to disclosure’
(DTI, 1990: 47). Gwilliam et al. (2005) draw on
DTI reports and Lloyd’s syndicate accounts to pro-
vide a case study of the results, and document the
widespread plundering of principals’ funds by their
agents. Towards $100m were siphoned off by
agents in just two notorious cases; and these were
evidently not isolated cases: the Chief Executive of
Lloyd’s suggested how widespread malpractice
had become: ‘doubtful arrangements’, breaching
the laws of agency, affected ‘syndicates covering
92% of the total membership of Lloyd’s’ (Davison,
1987: 62). And he attributed it directly to informa-
tion problems – the absence of modern accounting
and audit standards – which masked the self-inter-
ested actions of the agents.
In relation to valuation and investment deci-
sions, Smith (1996) provides a telling example of
the consequence of weak accounting standards.
The UK public company Coloroll enjoyed the
stock market’s support for a series of acquisitions
which secured a ten-fold growth of the business in
just four years. But in the absence of effective ac-
counting standards, the company reported profits
which were vastly swollen by accounting sleights
of hand – notably the use of the notorious ‘reor-
ganisation provision’ which contributed up to
£52m of its £56m reported profits in 1988–1989.
The following year the company failed: equity pre-
viously valued at £424m had evaporated.
The raft of standards subsequently introduced by
the ASB8 made a repetition of such blatant misin-
formation and market failure less likely.9 But the
takeover market continues to witness a tension 
between standard-setters and the companies re-
porting their performance around M&A. Standard-
setters have sought to limit the discretion of
bidders’ managers to misinform shareholders of
their earnings ahead of share for share takeover,
discretion which Erikson and Wang (1998) and
Botsari and Meeks (2008) suggest has been sys-
tematically exercised to flatter the bidder’s track
record through managing accruals. 
This role of standards is increasingly recognised
in the finance literature: Shleifer and Vishny
(2003) build their theory of takeover on misin-
formed markets. Their influential study ‘points to
a powerful incentive for firms to get their equity
overvalued, so that they can make acquisitions
with stock’; and they recognise the role of earnings
management – of exploiting the discretion allowed
by accounting standards when reporting perform-
ance – in securing that overvaluation. A great deal
is at stake in such markets – which allocate control
of assets of up to £100 billion a year at the top of
the cycle10 in the UK, much more in the US. 
Transaction costs
Of course, the financial markets are not automati-
cally duped by accounting sleights of hand. Just be-
cause accounting standards do not mandate release
of a piece of price-relevant information does not
necessarily mean the market will not seek it out and
impound it in share price. If markets are ‘semi-
strong efficient’ in Fama’s (1970) terms, then prices
will reflect all publicly available information, irre-
spective of whether the accounting standard-setters
have decreed that it be spelled out in the financial
reports. The misallocation of resources associated
with the Coloroll case or the Shleifer and Vishny
model is associated instead with misinformation
which is hidden from public view – insider informa-
tion, opaque to the outside investor, which only a
market which is strong form efficient will impound;
and few people will claim the equity market is char-
acterised by strong form efficiency.
There is a longstanding literature documenting
cases where the market has ‘seen through’ ac-
counting manipulation and ‘reversed out’ move-
ments in the income statement or balance sheet
which arise just because of an accounting change.
Archibald (1972) reported that, other things being
equal, companies which adjusted their deprecia-
tion methods in order to swell the earnings number
would not be rewarded with a higher share price:
the market possessed enough information to
recognise, quantify and discount the effect on
earnings. Similar conclusions were reached in re-
lation to the choice between merger and acquisi-
tion accounting (pooling/purchase in the US):
since analysts could readily replicate from public
information a set of accounts on the alternative
basis (e.g. adding back goodwill amortisation), the
market would be unimpressed by reported earn-
ings which were higher simply because the compa-
ny had chosen merger accounting to avoid an
amortisation charge (Hong et al., 1978).11
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8 The context and aims of that phase of rapid progress in
regulation are well covered by some of the papers of Geoffrey
Whittington, a leading participant in the process, e.g. Whittington
(1989), Tweedie and Whittington (1990), Whittington (1993)
and Thorell and Whittington (1994). And Whittington (2008)
addresses the role of IASB regulation in relation to stewardship.
9 Though, in the US, the experience of reserve reversals at
WorldCom – subsequently the biggest bankruptcy in history –
has some characteristics in common with Coloroll (see Meeks,
2002).
10 ONS (2008).
11 Though Lys and Vincent (1995) analyse the anomalous
case where AT&T was willing to pay upwards of $50m more
for NCR if it could structure the deal as a merger rather than
an acquisition.
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Even so, achieving the right outcome in such
cases is not costless, and the literature suggests a
role for accounting standards in reducing these
costs. 
One strand of this literature emphasises redun-
dant or duplicative expenditure. Hirshleifer (1971)
analyses cases where it pays investors to devote re-
sources to get a piece of information ahead of
other investors when that information is price-sen-
sitive, and so is valuable for making trading gains.
It is rational for individual investors to spend on
this activity, even if it yields no social benefit –
even if it is a zero-sum game where one trader’s
gain is another’s loss.12 But from a social point of
view, simply mandating its disclosure would save
the competitive information search.13 A recent ex-
ample, though one where there were social conse-
quences as well as private ones, might be banks’
exposure to sub-prime lending, where analysts
were in a headlong rush to guesstimate banks’ vul-
nerability on this account, because massive price
changes hinged on the result.
Is this a significant plank in the case for stan-
dards? Are search and related transaction costs in
the equity market actually material? Meeks and
Meeks (2002) attempt an estimate of such costs by
comparing the expense of actively managing a
portfolio of shares with the cost of passive man-
agement (e.g. an indexed fund). The results are not
precise and they comprise much more search ac-
tivity than could be made redundant by even the
most successful accounting standards. But for UK
equities the figure was around £1.8 billion.
A further category of transaction cost affected by
accounting standards is the cost of contracting, or
‘quasi-contracting’. Accounting numbers are used
in a range of contracts designed to restrict the free-
dom of signatories to exploit their informational
advantage, or to align the interests of both signato-
ries. These include the debt covenants in debt con-
tracts, specifying values for accounting numbers
or ratios which will trigger recall rights for the
lender (Citron, 1992), and remuneration contracts
for company directors – designed to limit the ‘neg-
ligence and profusion’ which Adam Smith expect-
ed of managers who had no stake in the business
(e.g. Meeks and Whittington, 1975; Forbes and
Watson, 1993).
A principal example of ‘quasi contracting’ is the
corporation tax bill. Whilst there are, of course,
important differences between taxable income
and the income reported to shareholders, never-
theless income governed by standards does deter-
mine the underlying, or default, tax base, to which
the authorities specify exceptions. Then in regu-
lated industries such as the utilities, the regulato-
ry formulae governing sales prices explicitly
embody income governed by standards in ‘rate of
return’ regimes, and indirectly depend on the
same measures in ‘RPI-x’ formulae, where the
value of x set by the regulator is heavily influ-
enced by recent accounting rates of return
(Whittington (1994)). 
Scott and Upton (1991: 5) emphasised the cost-
saving role of the standards in the contracting
process: ‘Without a body of [accounting] stan-
dards, lenders would be forced to negotiate such
contracts “from scratch”. [Those contracting]
would have to create their own comprehensive set
of accounting rules …’ The benefits of ‘off the
peg’ accounting measures arise not just in writing
contracts but also in enforcing them (Whittington,
1993). Scott and Upton give a related example
where the parties to a contract prefer well-defined
claims and obligations: ‘auditors see the possibili-
ty of lawsuits as a very real cost … As a result, au-
ditors frequently suggest including more detailed
and specific provisions in a pronouncement [on
standards]. By narrowing alternatives, auditor
judgement is reduced – a consequence that audi-
tors often view as a benefit’ (p. 7).
Accounting standards and financial innovation
Performance pricing in debt contracting offers a
recent example of financial innovation supported
by accounting standards. While accounting num-
bers have long been a feature of debt contracts,
much more sophisticated use of such numbers is
now being adopted through contracts embodying
performance pricing. This innovation makes the
interest rate charged on a loan vary with, for exam-
ple, the ratio of debt to earnings (Asquith et al.,
2005; Chatterjee, 2006). It means that a business
which becomes a better credit risk benefits from a
lower interest rate, without having to negotiate a
new loan contract; whilst a lender whose borrower
becomes a worse credit risk is compensated by a
higher risk premium in the interest rate; and with
this safeguard the lender can accept a lower inter-
est rate in the first place. Both sides stand to gain
from such contracts.
But the contracts would hardly be viable if, say,
earnings were poorly defined; because then the
borrower could mask its changing credit risk by
creative accounting, and the lender would have no
198 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
12 An example might be the outcome of litigation between
two firms, which would affect their respective earnings when
the settlement was known, but would not affect expected fu-
ture earnings.
13 Bromwich (1992) analyses a further reason why the mar-
ket may not reach the best collective outcome. He points to the
‘public good’ characteristics of accounting information: once
the information has been released to one user/consumer, it be-
comes available to all; and one person’s consumption does not
diminish the amount left over for others. There is then a prob-
lem in getting the payment from consumers who stand to ben-
efit from the good (information in this case) – there is an
incentive to ‘free ride’; and so the information is under-pro-
vided: production is likely to be restricted below the level war-
ranted by the benefits it could bring.
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clear definition of earnings on the basis of which it
could pursue a claim in court. This innovation pre-
supposes standardised accounts.
Reducing entry barriers and network effects in
accounting
Metcalfe’s Law, in relation to network effects, em-
phasises the number of two-way communication
linkages, with the value of the network rising dis-
proportionately as its size increases. Accounting
standards can facilitate these communication link-
ages – in effect they provide a dictionary of report-
ing language and concepts. There is a virtuous
circle: once a firm adopts the language of a partic-
ular market, it can trade with the investors on that
market, and its entry to the market increases the
availability of securities, supporting a larger num-
ber of investors who can participate in the market,
and giving investors greater choice of risk-return
profiles when designing their portfolios. 
By simply adopting US standards (which result-
ed in very different numbers from the German
ones – see below) Daimler Benz was able to gain
immediate access to the US stock market, and US
investors had an enhanced range of securities
available without having to learn German account-
ing (Ball, 1999).
Standards and trust between sellers and buyers
The earlier examples from Lloyd’s and from
Coloroll illustrate the scale of direct costs incurred
by participants in the financial markets who are
misinformed about their investments. But Akerlof
argued that these costs are exceeded by the indirect
costs of misinformation: ‘The cost of dishon-
esty … lies not only in the amount by which the
purchaser is cheated, the cost must also include the
loss incurred from driving legitimate business out
of existence.’ This application of Gresham’s Law
constitutes, in Akerlof’s view, ‘the major cost of
dishonesty’. Lev (1988: 7) applies the argument to
the securities markets: ‘At the extreme, suspecting
gross information asymmetries, uninformed in-
vestors may quite rationally withdraw from trad-
ing … altogether … A massive withdrawal of
uninformed investors from the market will … de-
prive the economy of the allocational and risk-
sharing benefits of large and efficient capital
markets’. Such market collapse has been seen in
the 2008 turmoil in financial markets following a
loss of confidence by investors – prompted initial-
ly by mistrust of the balance sheet values of mort-
gage loans.
It is not straightforward to verify such links em-
pirically. But suggestive evidence in support
comes from three sources. First, in relation to
Lloyd’s, Gwilliam et al. (2005) chart the sharp rise
in business in the period after a new regulatory
regime was introduced, consistent with the
Gresham/Akerlof/Lev expectation. Second, com-
paring a weakly regulated regime with more vigor-
ously regulated ones, Shleifer and Vishny (1997)
report the assets of Russian oil companies being
valued at a 99% discount to those of their Western
counterparts; and they attribute this in part to the
potential plunder of assets by managers, because
of their weak monitoring and control arrange-
ments. Third, having reviewed a range of evidence
on the link between the level of information dis-
closure and the terms on which firms can raise fi-
nance, Botosan (2006: 31) concludes: ‘The
over-riding conclusion of existing theoretical and
empirical research is that greater disclosure re-
duces the cost of capital’.
3.2. The downside of accounting standards
Increased barriers to entry
As early as 1991, long before Sarbanes-Oxley,
Beresford (1991), the former chairman of FASB,
expressed the concern that ‘many foreign compa-
nies are reluctant to offer their securities in US
public markets or list them on US exchanges be-
cause they are unwilling to comply with the volu-
minous and detailed US accounting and disclosure
requirements or submit to the SEC’s jurisdiction.’
Zeff (1998) reports evidence which may have lain
behind Beresford’s concerns: the London Stock
Exchange had more foreign listings than New
York (526, against 343), with a higher capitalisa-
tion ($3.8 trillion, against $2.1 trillion). 
Risk of monopolisation 
It is sometimes alleged that imposing demanding
standards yields a competitive advantage to large
accounting/audit firms, which can spread the fixed
costs of compliance across a larger number of
clients, and whose – typically larger – clients can
more readily bear the fixed costs of audit and com-
pliance. This allegation, and the associated one 
of regulatory capture (see the discussion in 
Section 2.2 of Salop and Scheffman (1983)), finds
particular support in systems where audit partners
of large firms are heavily represented on the 
standard-setting body.
Regulatory and compliance costs
Meeks and Meeks (2002) report the costs of the
accounting standard-setter in three jurisdictions,
the UK, the US and Sweden. For the UK (this pre-
dates the IASB regime), the regulator’s costs were
equivalent to around one-tenth of 1% of the audit
fee of the regulatees. 
Compliance costs are harder to calculate, with
response bias playing a part. FASB (1988) report-
ed in relation to FAS 96 that ‘one Fortune 10 com-
pany testifying about the costs of a new standard
on accounting for income taxes estimated the cost
at “one-half a man year to administer the rule”’;
whilst another Fortune 10 company, testifying 
on the same day, estimated ‘the ongoing effort to
Vol. 39 No. 3 2009 International Accounting Policy Forum. 199
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require the equivalent of 40 full-time employees,
costing five to six million dollars annually’.
Carsberg and Page (1984) estimated the recur-
ring costs of maintaining the new set of (current
cost) accounts required by SSAP16 as 0.007% of
turnover at the median – in their words ‘hardly
great enough to explain the strong opposition that
some preparers show to current cost accounting’
(p. 176). In relation to the new standards (and
other regulation) introduced at Lloyd’s, Gwilliam
et al. (2005) estimated the compliance costs to be
of the same order of magnitude as the regulator’s
costs, with the extra audit costs totalling a some-
what smaller further sum. ICAEW (2007) estimat-
ed that the typical cost of preparing the first IFRS
consolidated financial statements of listed compa-
nies ranged from 0.05% of turnover to 0.31% (and
the range for the recurring cost in subsequent years
was 0.008% to 0.06% – in both cases costs as a
proportion of turnover declined with firm size).
Constraints on product design and reduced variety
This potential problem is at the heart of some of
the hostility to a single set of accounting standards
for the world – the topic of Section 5: we outline
the objections there.
4. How many standards? Four lessons
from economics 
Our objective in Sections 4 and 5 of this paper is
to explore what lessons we can draw from the
above on the desirability (or otherwise) of having
a single standard. This section draws out four les-
sons from the economics literature surveyed above
about the optimum number of standards in differ-
ent circumstances.
None of these constitute a direct answer to the
question: ‘should there be a single global account-
ing standard?’ Rather, they provide four examples
of how the same trade-off between the case for a
single standard and the case for variety is re-
solved.14
4.1. The simple theory of standards races
The simple theory of standards races (David,
1985; Farrell and Saloner, 1985; Katz and Shapiro,
1985) gives useful insights into the conditions
under which it is desirable to have a single stan-
dard and the conditions under which it is better to
have more than one standard. 
By considering the models developed by Farrell
and Saloner (1985) and Katz and Shapiro (1985) it
can be shown that if the following conditions apply:
(a) there is little demand for product variety per se,
(b) network effects are unbounded above,
(c) there is no anti-competitive risk from having a
single standard,
then a single standard may be the ‘right’ solution.
This can be explained intuitively. If there is little
demand for product variety per se, then there is no
loss from having only a single variant in the mar-
ket. If network effects are unbounded above, then
the value that a user obtains from using the same
system15 as lots of other people continues to in-
crease without limit as the network of users grows.
In that case, it is always beneficial to make the net-
work of users of the same system as large as pos-
sible. And if there is no risk of monopolistic abuse
of a single standard, then again there is no reason
to avoid having just the one standard.
However, this result depends critically on the as-
sumptions made. If there is a strong demand for
product variety, then a single standard will be un-
duly constraining for at least some users. In addi-
tion, Arthur (1989) has shown that if network
effects are bounded above, then it is likely that the
outcome of a standards race will be that two or
more standards emerge in parallel, and that is for
the best. Moreover, we know from experience in a
number of markets that when a market is dominat-
ed by a single de facto (and proprietary) standard,
monopolistic abuse is common (see Section 2.2).
Indeed, we could argue that conditions (a) and
(c) are unlikely but not impossible. And Swann
(2002) has argued that (b) is highly implausible.
Why is that? The argument is slightly different for
direct and indirect network effects. To put it sim-
ply, in the case of the former, the benefits we enjoy
as ever more people join a network tend to tail off
after a while because the new recruits are unknown
to us and we have no wish to communicate with
them. Or, in the case of the latter, we obtain all the
indirect network benefits we want when the net-
work reaches some given size and further increas-
es in network size bring no further benefits.16
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14 There is a related question: does the adoption of a single
set of accounting standards presume convergence in models of
corporate governance? There is some discussion of this in the
literature on corporate governance (e.g. Hansmann and
Kraakman, 2004; Hertig, 2004).
15 This argument applies to all kinds of products, services,
technologies or systems. For economy of exposition, we use
the word ‘system’ to refer to all of these.
16 In the discussion after our lecture, some suggested that the
use of common accounting standards might be one example
where network effects are indeed unbounded above. Consider
a large, multinational company which is both horizontally and
vertically integrated: call it X. Such a company might, in prin-
ciple, wish to do business with almost any company in the
world. So each time another firm joins the community using a
global standard, whichever firm it is and wherever it is located,
then X will derive some additional benefit. However, X would
have to be an exceptional company to experience this unlimit-
ed growth of network effects. Most companies have geograph-
ical or sectoral limits to their interests and so network effects
reach a maximum when all the related firms in their sectors and
countries of operation have adopted the same standard. And for
small firms, network effects from the use of common account-
ing standards would reach a maximum quite quickly.
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4.2. Standards and variety: simulation model
Some simple models of horizontal and vertical
product differentiation can give us a handle on the
very difficult question of whether markets gener-
ate too much or too little product variety. Swann
(2007) develops a simple model which incorpo-
rates various types of variety-reduction standard.
In this model innovators can introduce product in-
novations as add-ons that build on existing prod-
ucts. Each add-on can either alter the horizontal
product characteristics of the base product or in-
crease the vertical product quality of the base
product, or offer some combination of these. But
innovators can only market add-ons that build on
existing products if either: (a) these are their own
products; or (b) these are available as open stan-
dards. If they are proprietary standards, then only
the owner of the proprietary standard can sell add-
ons that build on the existing product.
The model has one essential feature which
drives the results. The magnitude of any innova-
tion embodied in an add-on depends on the poten-
tial market share that might be captured by that
add-on. If the add-on is one of just a few that will
be offered at a particular time (n is small), then in-
novators find it viable (and profitable) to sell sub-
stantial innovations. If, by contrast, the add-on is
one of very many offered at a particular time (n is
large), then innovators only find it viable to sell
rather modest innovations.
These features of the model give it the same
character as the model of standards sketched in
Swann (2000). Standardisation does for innovation
something similar to what pruning does for fruit
trees. A programme of pruning may constrain the
shape of the tree and limit growth in some direc-
tions in the short term. But in the longer term,
pruning promotes a healthy shape in the tree and
helps to maximise the amount of useable fruit that
can be harvested. In the same way, standardisation
constrains innovation options in the short term, but
by promoting healthy market development can
maximise useful product variety in the long term.
The conclusions to be drawn depend in detail on
the model parameters. But a fairly general conclu-
sion appears. The optimum number of variety re-
ducing standards is generally for three add-ons at
any stage. This generates a happy balance of hori-
zontal product variety and vertical product quality.
By contrast, one standard does not generate nearly
enough variety. Two standards may do, but it can-
not be guaranteed. But in this model, there is little
to be gained from having more than three or four
standards. In that case, the overall product variety
and vertical product quality is reduced – although
that smaller product space will be very densely
packed. It is interesting that very many empirical
standards races turn into contests between two or
three competing standards, and it is interesting to
speculate on whether that outcome is, in fact, an
efficient solution to the dual requirements of vari-
ety and market size.17
4.3. Optimum number of varieties
A very interesting and detailed study by Bongers
(1982) set out to compute the optimum number of
product varieties in a particular market. His paper
addresses two issues. If there is to be a limited va-
riety (n) of products in a product range, what is the
best set of varieties? And, what is the right number
of varieties (n)?
Bongers analyses these questions with reference
to the case of concrete posts. It may be that ac-
counting professionals do not find this apparent
comparison very complimentary! However, we
hope they will not be offended and will read on,
because there is an important lesson to be learnt
from this study.
Bongers (1982) showed that it is best if the den-
sity of the product range follows the distribution of
demand: the distances between the different vari-
eties should be lower near the peak of the density
function and higher in the tails of the distribution.
He found that, depending on some assumptions,
the optimum number of posts was between 5 and
10. Bongers went on to compare his optimum with
the actual size patterns in the Dutch (Nen)
Standard. The Dutch standard recommends 7 stan-
dard sizes, which is right in the middle of his com-
puted range (5–10). But he found that the Nen
varieties do not follow the density of demand as
they should. With the Nen standards, there are too
many varieties in the upper tail, while in the opti-
mised pattern, the designs are compressed in the
region of the peak, and much more dispersed in the
tail.
For our present purposes, however, the most in-
teresting result is this. Bongers shows that adjust-
ment costs (born by the customer) can rise sharply
if n is made too small. Too few standards can im-
pose substantial costs on customers because there
is too little variety.
What can we learn from this? The uses to which
concrete posts are more limited and straightfor-
ward than the uses of accounting standards. But
even so, the market still requires some variety to
satisfy the various different uses. If that is true of
concrete posts, then surely it is also true of ac-
counting standards which are put to many different
uses by many different people? For any one use,
perhaps, a single standard is sufficient and desir-
Vol. 39 No. 3 2009 International Accounting Policy Forum. 201
17 However, we need to stress that the above results depend
on the assumption that standards are open. If they are closed,
then simulations with low values of n generate outcomes with
a limited number of horizontally differentiated products. The
range may be quite large but the product space is not densely
packed. So if standards are closed, the outcomes of simula-
tions with larger n are preferable to those with a smaller n.
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able. But when we recognise the multifarious uses
of accounting standards, then a single standard is
not sufficient.
4.4. Standards and innovation: empirical evidence
The work of Temple et al. (2005) uses data from
the Community Innovation Survey (CIS3) and the
BSI Online database of standards to examine
whether standards enable or constrain innovation,
or both. We saw above that constraining and help-
ing go hand in hand. If standards help innovation
it is more likely than not that they will also con-
strain innovation. And if standards constrain inno-
vation, it is more likely than not that they will also
help innovation.
That research also examined whether there was
any evidence connecting the number and vintage
of standards and their tendency to constrain inno-
vators. Temple et al. (2005) found that: 
• If stock of standards is ‘too small’ or ‘too large’,
then standards are more likely to constrain inno-
vation.
• If stock of standards is ‘too old’ or ‘too young’,
then standards are more likely to constrain inno-
vation.
In short, there is an optimum number of standards
for any industry and it must be neither too large nor
too small. Equally, there is an optimum vintage for
standards: neither too old nor too young.
Of course, technology standards become outdat-
ed quite rapidly – much more rapidly, we suspect,
than accounting standards. So that part of the story
will not carry over. But the story about an opti-
mum number may be relevant.
In concluding this section, can we draw any gen-
eral answers from the above to the fundamental
question: what is the ‘right’ number of standards?
In truth, we have to concede that the economics 
literature provides no simple answer to this ques-
tion. But we can say that only in rather special cir-
cumstances is a single standard the ‘right’ answer.
Generally speaking, the optimum number is small
but greater than one.18
5. A single set of global accounting 
standards?
This section explores particular features of the ac-
counting context which inform the choice between
a single set of global standards or continuing di-
versity.
5.1. The prima facie case for global accounting
standards: rapidly globalising financial markets;
information ‘lost in translation’
Historically, standardisation of financial ac-
counting has tended to follow the integration of the
markets served by the accounts. For example, the
move to unified national accounting in the US in
the early 20th century followed the integration of
the national economy. Similarly the present impe-
tus for global accounting standards follows the ac-
celerating integration of the world economy.
Figure 1 provides one illustration of this integra-
tion, charting the growth in UK portfolio invest-
ment abroad in equities in the last 20 years. In the
decade ending 1996, the mean level of annual in-
vestment was towards £6 billion; in the subsequent
decade, it reached over £23 billion.
Table 1 illustrates the problem which diverse ac-
counting standards present to participants in those
international markets, reporting an example from
Nobes (1997). When Daimler Benz became the
first German company to list on the New York
Stock Exchange, it published for 1993 net income
figures compiled according to both German and
US standards. The comparison provides a telling
(admittedly, extreme) suggestion of the informa-
tion which might be lost in translation between 
accounting regimes. One set of accounting con-
ventions produced a profit of some six hundred
million DM, the other a loss of over eighteen hun-
dred million.
Another famous example is the transition of
Vodafone from UK rules to IFRS for the half-year
to 30 September 2004: a UK loss of £3,195m
turned into an IFRS profit of £3,615m.19
Prima facie, the case for common standards in
such circumstances is compelling: without them,
cross-border portfolio and direct investment may
be distorted, cross-border monitoring of manage-
ment by shareholders obstructed, and cross-border
contracting inhibited; or the cost of these activities
may be needlessly inflated by complex translation.
This section considers whether the benefits of di-
minishing these accounting barriers between mar-
kets dominate the costs of operating global, rather
than local, standards.
Table 1
Daimler Benz net income, 1993
DM million
German GAAP 615
US GAAP –1,893
Source: Nobes (1997)
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18 A referee of this journal noted that the absence of a single
global standard for electric sockets is not a particularly serious
issue. Even the frequent traveller can manage the diversity of
sockets in the US, the UK and the EU by using an adaptor. This
might not be a viable option if every single country had a differ-
ent standard but it is viable if the number of standards is small. 
19 Again we are grateful to Chris Nobes for the details.
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5.2. Trading off the benefits and costs of a single
global set of standards 
In reviewing the economics of standards, Section
4.1 points to a number of trade-offs in determining
the optimal number of standard-setters. Other fields
of economics which deal with analogous decisions
– whether to integrate into a single market, whether
to rely on a single supplier – similarly point to ten-
sions between conflicting considerations and the
resulting trade-offs facing policy-makers. For ex-
ample, the economics of currency unions (Gregory,
1987) recognise the reduced transaction costs and
entry barriers from a common currency, but also
the potential costs for a participant economy of
being locked into an exchange rate with the rest of
the world when it has become inappropriate. The
traveller or trader within the union is saved the
costs of exchanging, say, francs for lira; but the ex-
porter may be forced out of business by an ex-
change rate with the rest of the world higher than
would have prevailed had the national currency re-
mained independent. Then the economics of cus-
toms unions (Hazlewood, 1987) has to weigh up
the union’s effects on trade creation as compared to
its effects on trade diversion. Thus the domestic
producer of sugar beet may flourish within the
union while the sugar cane grower outside the
union (who can produce sugar at lower cost) may
perish. Finally, the economics of monopoly
(Scherer and Ross, 1990) set the scale economies
gained by a new monopolist who has integrated the
production of former rivals against the consumer
surplus foregone by former customers whom the
new monopolist can now price out of the market. 
Inevitably, determining the optimal scope for the
jurisdiction of accounting standard-setting – whether
to have several ‘unions’ for standard-setting or just
one – is likewise characterised by a series of trade-
offs20 and cost-benefit calculations. This section
outlines the headings which might appear in such 
a cost-benefit analysis, or ‘profit and loss account’,
for global standards; and suggests some of the ev-
idence available to populate that account. 
Costs of the regulator
These are the most visible costs of standards. In
many economic discussions of consolidating pro-
duction in one supplier (as it were, the IASB),
avoiding cost duplication and securing scale
economies would loom large. But in the account-
ing case the impact of replacing several standard-
setters with a single producer may not be great.
This is for three reasons. First, set against the total
cost of quality control in the provision of financial
information, the standard-setter’s costs are small:
Section 3 reports a figure equivalent to just one-
tenth of 1% of the aggregate audit fee of the 
regulatees. Second, the multiple regulators already
share production costs, via joint research projects,
Vol. 39 No. 3 2009 International Accounting Policy Forum. 203
Figure 1
UK portfolio investment abroad: equity securities
(£billion, current prices)
Source: National Statistics, Financial Statistics, Table 14.1F, March 2008 and earlier issues.
20 Often the benefits and costs accrue to different people:
changes are not Pareto-improving. We do not pursue the re-
sultant social choice problems, which are analysed in
Bromwich’s (1985) pioneering study of the economics of ac-
counting standards.
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so duplication has been reduced, without consoli-
dating into one regulator. And third, it is likely that
different countries or regions would need to retain
some local regulatory capacity (as with the UK’s
ASB) in order to mediate between the global 
standard-setter and local markets and institutions,
and to deal with reporting entities outside the remit
of a global standard-setter (see below).21
Compliance costs for the regulatee
The potential impact on these costs of moving to a
single set of global standards is ambiguous. If, on
average, the new global regime is more demanding
than the ones it replaces, total compliance costs
will rise; and vice versa.
Regulatees report very high estimates for these
costs in the most demanding current regime, the
US. The total compliance cost of maintaining their
US listing (not just accounting costs) for cross-list-
ed German Dax 30 companies has been reported as
£21m to £56m per company per annum (Jenkins,
2004). However, such numbers were supplied in
the course of lobbying to relax some of the regula-
tory requirements: the suppliers of the data there-
fore had an interest in overstating the burden of
regulation. Such response bias is widely encoun-
tered in relation to this element of cost (SIB, 1995,
1997; FASB, 1988). And Section 3 above reports
much smaller compliance cost estimates associat-
ed with even very substantial changes in regulation
– estimates of the same (small) order of magnitude
as the regulator’s costs.
Loss of competition in standard-setting
It is an irony that fostering the most competitive
stock market – covering the whole world – via
global accounting standards, means assigning pro-
duction of the standards to a single monopoly sup-
plier. And the costs of assigning standard-setting to
a monopoly need to be set against the benefits
from creating more competitive capital markets. 
The work of Zeff (2002), on the political ele-
ment in standard-setting, suggests one reason why
such a monopoly could have efficiency costs. For
example, he describes the evolution of US policy
on accounting for business combinations. In 1999,
on a calculation of the net economic benefits, the
US standard-setter, FASB, called for the mandato-
ry amortisation of goodwill (the elimination of
pooling, which had allowed some firms to escape
amortisation). But FASB encountered political re-
sistance in the US Senate, which had been lobbied
by special interest groups; and by 2001 the
Exposure Draft issued by FASB submitted to this
political pressure: the resulting standards (SFAS
141 and 142) disallowed amortisation altogether.
Is the political distortion of standard-setting any
more problematic for a global standard-setter than
for national or regional ones? Dye and Sunder
(2001) suggest that the political problems could be
significantly worse: they argue that the larger the
constituency of the standard-setter, the fewer disclo-
sure requirements the constituents will agree on; so
the result will be more lax standards than could be
secured for a smaller jurisdiction, and consequently
there will be more scope for earnings management. 
A further difference is that if there is some com-
petition among standard-setters, the market can
‘punish’ the local standard-setter for its mistakes.
We noted above the fears of the Chairman of
FASB that the heavy demands of the US standard-
setter would deter firms from listing in the US
market, and the evidence from Zeff that the
London stock market had overtaken New York in
the number and value of foreign listings.
But this correction mechanism disappears if firms
have no alternative market. They can no longer
‘walk with their feet’ if the regulators get it wrong.
Another drawback of a monopoly regulator is
that it might stifle innovation. While FASB was
engaged in a political struggle in the US over its
plans to outlaw amortisation, the UK’s Accounting
Standards Board developed and introduced an 
alternative approach to purchased goodwill – the
innovation of impairment tests, first proposed by
UK academics Arnold et al. (1992).22 This new
and relatively radical practice was subsequently
adopted – on a wider scale – first by FASB and
then by IASB (Li and Meeks (2006)). 
Loss of bespoke accounting standards
The debate on global standards has produced sev-
eral variants of the argument that local conditions
demand diverse local accounting standards. 
(a) Diverse local capital markets 
One variant of this argument is that financing
arrangements differ locally, and these produce 
diverse financial reporting needs (e.g. Fearnley
and Sunder, 2005). For example, some economies
have relied much more heavily on intimate, bank-
based financing, rather than ‘Anglo-Saxon’ arm’s
length stock markets (e.g. Cable, 1985). The
German banker, sitting on the supervisory board of
a client company, controlling not just bank-owned
equity but also the proxy votes of the bank’s retail
customers and the supply of debt finance, does not
have to rely for information on the company’s pub-
lished reports. So why, it is asked, impose the alien
and expensive reporting standards which have
been developed in foreign markets?
Of course, the reporting needs of private compa-
204 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
21 Otherwise national considerations are likely to be neg-
lected by the international standard-setter. In addition, the
local reporting entities outside the stock market (e.g. unlisted
firms, not for profit organisations) – more numerous than list-
ed companies – may lose the network benefits of links to the
regulated sector. Also, accounting innovation often originates
with national standard-setters – see below.
22 Building on work by Graham Stacy and David Tweedie.
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nies and of other organisations are different from
those of public listed companies, and may vary
with institutional differences across countries. But
the notion of a single global set of standards is nor-
mally interpreted as being one for public listed
companies. Other organisations are generally dealt
with by having a hierarchy of accounting require-
ments in the local economy. In the US, for exam-
ple, private companies are exempt from FASB
standards. But this points to another trade-off: the
more onerous are any global standards for public
companies, the fewer private businesses will reap
the network benefits of participating in the stan-
dard reporting language of the public markets. 
However, it is not clear that the information needs
of a shareholder in a public market vary significant-
ly across national boundaries. And, indeed, consid-
ering the German illustration, the presence of some
shareholders in a public company with privileged
access to information raises questions about minor-
ity shareholder rights and insider dealing. These are
areas where rigorous mandated public disclosure is
often seen as an especially valuable safeguard. 
(b) Diverse local enforcement 
Ball (2006) emphasises the poor quality of en-
forcement in some jurisdictions participating in
IFRS. In part, this is a problem of audit, focussing
on doubts whether international standards would
be fully implemented in practice, even though the
preparers were paying lip service to the standards.
This is a problem which can be mitigated through
market mechanisms: firms in countries with weak-
er audit traditions and practices could hire expen-
sive Big Four international auditors to vouch for
their quality and compliance with IFRS (just as
private companies with local auditors sometimes
turn to more prestigious auditors when going pub-
lic). But Ball points also to less tractable problems
when transplanting accounting standards from
common law countries to code law settings with
less respect for protecting shareholder value and
minority rights.
(c) Diverse local economies 
A third argument for diversity in reporting is that
some disclosures or procedures which may be de-
sirable for highly developed economies may be in-
feasible in less developed ones. An example might
be the adoption of fair value reporting, which it
might be feasible to implement in a large advanced
economy with liquid markets for the asset in ques-
tion, but not in a small economy with no such mar-
ket (Ball, 2006). 
Of course, whilst it is true that such problems
will be more acute in smaller, more isolated
economies, they are not absent from the most high-
ly developed economies: mark to market is easier
for assets such as government securities than for,
say, the Channel Tunnel, and alternative measure-
ment and disclosure arrangements are generally
necessary anyway for when suitable liquid markets
do not exist. It is just that these would have to be
relied upon more frequently in smaller economies
with illiquid markets; and this difference would
hamper comparison of accounts across countries.
5.3. Gains from integration in a larger, more
competitive market
Global accounting standards would enable the
world’s stock markets to become more closely in-
tegrated. Other things being equal, the larger the
market, the greater the scope for competition
among buyers and sellers and for the division of
labour – key drivers of efficiency in Adam Smith’s
scheme. The larger market expands the opportuni-
ties for risk-sharing and risk-matching. The more
closely the world’s stock markets approach a sin-
gle market, therefore, the lower should be the
transaction costs for investors and the cost of cap-
ital for firms in that market. Crucial to the calcula-
tion, then, are estimates of the cost penalties from
operating in markets smaller than a single world
market, or – put the other way round – the gains
which would arise from moving from smaller, seg-
mented markets, divided by different accounting
standards, to a single integrated global market.
Transaction costs
(a) Bid-ask spreads
Table 2 reports estimates of bid-ask spreads, which
affect the cost of actively trading a portfolio. The
Vol. 39 No. 3 2009 International Accounting Policy Forum. 205
Table 2
Average bid-ask spreads for different stock
markets
Market Mean bid-ask Average firms
per month
United Kingdom 0.022 537
France 0.026 374
Germany 0.037 450
Hong Kong 0.150 188
Denmark 0.194 36
Belgium 0.201 22
Italy 0.202 75
Notes
(1) All figures are time-series averages of the
monthly bid-ask spreads, Jan. 1998 – Oct. 2007.
(2) Includes all firms listed on the respective coun-
try all-share index.
(3) Bid-ask spreads smaller than zero or larger than
1 were filtered out.
(4) Spreads are measured as the difference be-
tween ask and bid price and given in the table
as a percentage of bid price.
(5) Estimated using data from Thomson Financial
Datastream.
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table shows a large difference in the spread for
small markets compared with large ones – of the
order of 20% for the smaller markets such as
Belgium or Denmark, but narrowing to around
2.5% for the larger French market – substantially
reducing investors’ costs of trading. However, at
first sight (this is only a simple bivariate compari-
son, with no allowance for other influences on in-
ternational differences), the gains from further
scale are small: the figure is 2.2% for the larger
UK market.
(b) Translation costs for multinational companies
Much of the early impetus for global accounting
standards came from multinational companies
whose subsidiaries had to report for some purpos-
es (e.g. tax, local borrowing, local benchmarking)
using local accounting regulations, but then con-
vert and consolidate these numbers into a different
framework for reports on global operations in the
market(s) where they were listed. We know no es-
timates of the costs of translation in such circum-
stances, but for companies such as ExxonMobil or
HSBC, which operate in 40 and 79 countries re-
spectively, they must have been considerable when
many of these countries operated idiosyncratic
standards.
Cost of capital
The literature gives a number of indications of the
economic value of larger, more integrated capital
markets; and this provides suggestive evidence of
the benefit of further integration. Hail and Leuz
(2006) calculate the implied cost of equity capital
for different national markets. Raw data on the
cost show only the slightest differences across the
large developed economies – the estimates for the
US and for the middle-sized UK and German mar-
kets were 10.2%, 10.6% and 10.1% respectively.
However, much more substantial differences
emerge for smaller, less developed economies –
thus Sri Lanka records a figure of 17.0% and
Egypt 25.3%.
Hail and Leuz explain that these raw differences
could reflect a range of international influences
apart from the scale of the respective market. They
allow for these in their multivariate econometric
work, but the same general result is confirmed: the
differences in cost of capital were ‘strongest for
markets that are least integrated [with world finan-
cial markets]’ and ‘the effects are substantially
smaller, and in several cases insignificant, in coun-
tries with integrated capital markets’ (p. 524).
The evidence of substantial benefits for firms lo-
cated in small segmented capital markets from
gaining access to larger pools of capital in the in-
ternational markets is corroborated by the work of
Errunza and Miller (2000). They trace the impact
on the cost of capital of firms which used
American depositary receipts (ADRs). These were
often firms from small segmented home markets.
And they find a substantial beneficial impact on
the firms’ cost of capital as a result of gaining ac-
cess to the larger market – a reduction of as much
as 40%.
The suggestion that the benefits of integration
are more muted for firms which already enjoy ac-
cess to substantial capital markets is supported by
the study of Daske (2006), which estimates the im-
pact on the cost of capital of German firms which
pre-adopted international accounting standards –
before the European Union mandated their publi-
cation. Such firms therefore stood to gain the ben-
efits from common accounting standards of
greater accessibility to international finance.
However, the study fails to find evidence of any
beneficial effect on the cost of capital from this
new standardised disclosure for these firms from a
medium-sized home market.
All the studies qualify their results extensively,
acknowledging the difficulty of measuring the cost
of capital, let alone identifying the contributions of
different explanatory variables when limited data
are available. Nevertheless, some consistency
emerges: the benefits of improved access to the
larger pool of capital can be very substantial for
firms from small segmented markets, but the scale
economies seem to diminish as the size of the
home market increases.
6. Concluding remarks
In his (rather sceptical) review of the pros and cons
of IFRS for investors, Ball (2006) emphasises that
‘the clear majority of economic … activity re-
mains intranational’ (p. 16). This is a perspective
which is perhaps easier to sustain from a stand-
point within the huge US economy than it is for
economies at the other end of the size range and
heavily reliant on international trade and invest-
ment, e.g. Luxembourg or Singapore. And in the
light of the very rapid growth we illustrated for in-
ternational financial transactions, it is not clear
how long it will be sustainable even for the US fi-
nancial system. The differences in international re-
porting practice prior to IFRS – which we
illustrated with the Daimler Benz comparison –
constituted a palpable barrier to efficient interna-
tional investment, monitoring and contracting.
And the literature suggests that being confined to
small segmented capital markets imposes a sub-
stantially larger cost of capital on firms and trans-
action costs on investors, which would inhibit
much worthwhile investment. Although we do not
have available all elements of the cost-benefit cal-
culation, the evidence points to substantial net
gains for smaller economies which have joined the
IFRS regime.
As Sections 2 and 4 have reported, the econom-
ics of standards in other markets suggest that in a
206 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
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range of circumstances the optimal number of
standards has exceeded one. Important issues iden-
tified by the economists’ analysis include whether
network benefits are unbounded above. Some sug-
gestive evidence on such issues is presented for the
accounting case in Sections 3 and 5. But our evi-
dence is not decisive on whether a single monop-
oly standard-setter for the world would be superior
to, say, a duopoly of IASB and FASB. First, the
gains from eliminating duplication in standard-set-
ting are unlikely to be large. Then, while the min-
imum efficient size of a stock market exceeds that
of many of the smaller national markets, and the
scale economies available from integrating, say,
the Sri Lankan or Egyptian markets are substan-
tial, the further scale economies from integrating,
say, the London market with New York may be
less compelling; and this is consistent with
London’s success in attracting international list-
ings despite its smaller size. Moreover, the litera-
ture has identified a number of potential
drawbacks in the monopolisation of accounting
standards – not least the loss of market discipline
– a competitor system – for standard-setters who
get it wrong (perhaps under political pressure), and
the possibility of innovation being stifled. 
7. A postscript
In the discussion after our lecture, Professor
Geoffrey Whittington drew a parallel between
global accounting standards and standards for the
WWW. This is a most interesting analogy and
worthy of some comment.
At first sight, we might think that the WWW is a
powerful example of what can be achieved if we
have an ubiquitous global standard which is broad
in scope. But in fact, the standards that do exist on
the WWW are not quite like that.
Tim Berners-Lee (1999), who more than anyone
else can be credited with the invention of the
WWW, has written a fascinating account of its 
development. Berners-Lee outlines areas where
common standards are required – the analogue of
accounting questions addressed by standard-set-
ters. He emphasises that a key objective in achiev-
ing a global standard for the WWW was for the
standard protocols to aim for just a lowest common
denominator (LCD) of communication:
‘I would have to create a system with common
rules that would be acceptable to everyone. This
meant as close as possible to no rules at all.’
(Berners-Lee, 1999: 17)
It was clear to him that there was no future in
trying to shoe-horn existing users into a broad-
ranging common standard which varied from their
current use, as they would simply rebel at the idea.
His great achievement was to show that a lowest
common denominator protocol would suffice for
most purposes:
‘Making global standards is hard. The larger the
number of people who are involved, the worse it
is. In actuality, people can work together with
only a few global understandings, and many
local and regional ones … operating on such
“partial understanding” is fundamental, and we
do it all the time in the nonelectronic world.”
(Berners-Lee, 1999: 203–204)
The WWW is based on some lowest common
demoninator protocols which define rules for
when and how computers can talk to each other.
When computers agree to talk, they have to choose
a language in which they can understand each
other. If they both make routine use of the same
applications software, then they can choose that as
the common language. If they do not, then they
can both translate into HTML. This may put some
constraints on the extent to which they can share
information and some things are lost in translation,
but HTML is sufficient for many of the most basic
exchanges.23
Returning to accounting standards, Professor
Whittington asked whether the analogy was useful
for accounting – whether one approach might be
for the international standard-setter to aim just for
a basic LCD level of acceptable disclosure. Local
standard-setters would be obliged to provide the
core international standard material but would be
free, if they wish, to embellish with extra demands
for the local market.
The experience of the WWW does indeed pres-
ent a challenging benchmark when reviewing the
case for a single set of global accounting standards
and when reviewing the form that accounting stan-
dards should take – skeletal (LCD) or comprehen-
sive. What, if anything, distinguishes accounting
standards from WWW standards? Why is the glob-
alisation of standards controversial for accounting,
and not for the WWW?24
These questions could perhaps be addressed by
comparing the history of the WWW with that of
international accounting standards. The work of
the IASC, the forerunner of the IASB, could be in-
terpreted as the search for LCD standards, which
allowed substantial local diversity within the com-
mon framework, and were voluntary rather than
mandatory (Camfferman and Zeff (2007)). Why
Vol. 39 No. 3 2009 International Accounting Policy Forum. 207
23 One referee has suggested that as the WWW evolves into
WEB 2.0, this metaphor for accounting standards may become
even more relevant. In an era where firms and investors use
Web 2.0 to facilitate a much richer and spontaneous interac-
tion, the implications for the development of accounting are
potentially very interesting.
24 Similar questions might be asked in relation to the paral-
lels with customs unions and currency unions mentioned ear-
lier: in those cases, by contrast, the world has not adopted a
single currency or a single customs union.
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did the LCD prevail for the WWW but not with the
IASC? Again, there has been pressure on the IASB
to move further still from LCD – to narrow options
in accounting, as in the ‘carve-out’ arrangements
for valuing financial instruments (e.g. ASB
(2004)).
Has this evolution of accounting standards away
from the WWW model been a mistake; or are there
crucial characteristics which distinguish account-
ing from the WWW, and argue in favour of a 
different solution?
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